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In many auctions, the auctioneer is an agent of the seller. This
delegation invites corruption. In this paper we propose a model of
corruption, examine how corruption affects the auction game, how
the anticipation of corruption affects bidding, and how it altogether
changes the revenue ranking of typical auctions. In addition we
characterize incentive schemes that may prevent corruption, and
compare them to the fee schedules employed by major auction
houses.















Whenever people face scarcity, some may be tempted to cheat. This is true
for ordinary thieves as well as for bidders in an auction for a government
construction job, or for those who compete for the right to host the Olympic
games. In this paper we study corruption, as a special form of cheating in
auctions.
Corruption is generally deﬁned as the “misuse of a position of trust
for dishonest gain.” In an auction context, corruption refers to the lack of
integrity of the auctioneer. It occurs whenever the auctioneer twists the auc-
tion rules in favor of some bidder(s), in exchange for bribes. Corruption may
be a simple bilateral aﬀair between one bidder and the auctioneer, but it may
also involve collusion among several bidders who jointly strike a deal with
the auctioneer.
Corruption is a frequently observed and well documented event in many
government procurement auctions. For example, the bidding for the con-
struction of a new metropolitan airport in the Berlin area was recently re-
opened after investigators found out that Hochtief AG, the winner of the
auction, had illegally acquired the application documents of the rival bid-
der IVG.1 As another example, in 1996 the authorities of Singapur ruled to
exclude Siemens AG from all public procurements for a period of ﬁve years
after they determined that Siemens had bribed Choy Hon Tim, the chief exec-
utive of Singapur’s public utility corporation PUB, in exchange for supplying
Siemens with information about rival bids for a major power station con-
1See Wall Street Journal, Aug. 19, 1999.
1struction project.2
An interesting early case of corruption in auctions is Goethe’s dealing
with his publisher Vieweg concerning the publication of his epic poem “Her-
mann and Dorothea” in the year 1797. Eager to know the true value of his
manuscript, Goethe designed a clever scheme. He handed over a sealed note
containing his reservation price to his legal Counsel Böttiger, and at the same
time asked the publisher Vieweg to make a bid and send it to Böttiger, promis-
ing publication rights if and only if the bid is at or above Goethe’s reserve
price, in which case Vieweg would have to pay Goethe’s reserve price. Obvi-
ously, if the scheme had been viewed as reliable, and if Vieweg had viewed
the secret reserve price as independent of his own valuation, he should have
bid his true valuation. On this ground, Moldovanu and Tietzel (1998) rightly
credit Goethe for anticipating the Vickrey auction. However, the scheme was
not reliable. Indeed, Böttiger opened Goethe’s envelope before Vieweg made
his bid, and, maliciously informed Vieweg about its content. Not surprisingly,
Vieweg’s bid was exactly equal to Goethe’s reserve price, and thus Goethe’s
clever scheme fell prey to corruption.
Of course, corruption in an auction cannot occur if the seller is also
the auctioneer. Corruption is only an issue if the auctioneer is the agent of
the seller. Such delegation occurs if the seller lacks the expertise to run the
auction himself, or if the seller is a complex organization like the collective
of citizens of a community, a state, or an entire nation. It does not matter
whether the auctioneer-agent is a specialized auction house or a government
2See Berliner Zeitung, Feb. 2, 1996.
2employee. What matters alone is the fact that the auctioneer acts indepen-
dently on behalf of the seller.
Corruption can also not work in an open-bid auction simply because
it lacks secrecy. However, open auctions may not be feasible if the bids are
complicated documents, as is the case of auctions for major construction
jobs or for the right to host the Olympics. In such auctions sealed-bids seems
to be the only feasible auction form. The fact that bids are sealed supplies
the secrecy needed for corrupt games being played between the auctioneer
and one or several bidders.3
Given the quantitative importance of auctions and the temptation of
corruption, three questions emerge. Are the usual sealed-bid auctions that
are used for procurement vulnerable to corruption? Is corruption harmful in
an eﬃciency sense? Can we make auctions corruption-proof? We will show
that the answers to these questions are Yes, Maybe, and Yes. Standard sealed-
bid auctions are indeed vulnerable to corruption, corruption may be socially
ineﬃcient, but fortunately there are ways to make auctions corruption-proof.
Wealsoshowthatcorruptionhasimportantdistributionaleﬀects. Specif-
ically, if the number of bidders is suﬃciently large, bidders’ expected equilib-
rium payoﬀs are unaﬀected by the possibility of corruption — a consequence
of the revenue equivalence principle. However, there is a transfer of wealth
from the seller to the agent who acts as auctioneer. Moreover, the seller also
bears the cost of the whole expected punishment.
3Most open auctions are actually hybrids between open and sealed-bid auctions, how-
ever, since sealed bids are usually permitted and in fact widely used. In the typical English
auction, sealed bids are treated in the same way as in a second-price auction.
3Furthermore, weﬁndthatrevenueequivalencebreaksdownifwidespread
corruption schemes that involve all bidders are feasible. In that case, corrup-
tion also involves a transfer of expected payoﬀs from the seller to bidders.
This case is interesting because it is congruent to other examples of break-
down of revenue equivalence studied in the literature, such as the analysis
of the breaking-up of partnerships (Cramton, Gibbons, and Klemperer, 1987)
and of the so-called Amish auctions (Engelbrecht-Wiggans, 1994).
2. structure of the game
There is one seller of a single good who faces n risk neutral potential buy-
ers. The seller has hired an auctioneer to run either a sealed-bid ﬁrst-price
or a sealed-bid second-price auction. From the auctioneer’s perspective bid-
ders’ valuations are iid random variables. Therefore, the auction game is
a standard symmetric independent private values model, which is however
supplemented by a corruption game.
In the sealed-bid ﬁrst-price auction, the corruption game is as follows:
After bids have been submitted, the auctioneer reveals the second highest
bid to the highest bidder. The auctioneer allows the highest bidder to lower
his bid to the level of the second highest bid, in exchange for a bribe.
In the sealed-bid second-price auction, the corruption game is slightly
more involved: The auctioneer reveals the three highest bids to the highest
and the second highest bidder. The three parties agree on removing the
second highest bid in exchange for side payments.
Corruption is detected with probability δ, in which case the auctioneer
4pays a penalty p0, the winning bidder pays a penalty p1, and, if the second
highest bidder is also involved, he pays a penalty p2. The penalty takes the
form of a jail sentence or the like; it is not a payment to the seller. Also, if
corruption is detected, the original bids have to be paid, i.e. b1 in the ﬁrst-
price and b2 in the second-price auction.
After the auction, the price paid is published, in order to make sure that
the auctioneer does not simply ignore the highest or the two highest bidders,
respectively.
Valuations v1,...,v n are independent draws (no aﬃliation) from the
distribution F with support [0,1]. We denote the distribution of the highest
valuation of n draws with F1, and the distribution of the highest valuation
of n − 1 draws with G1. By the iid assumption, F1 = Fn and G1 = Fn−1.W e
denote the joint density of the ith and jth highest valuations of n draws
with fij. b1,...,b n denote the bids. W.l.o.g. we order bidders in such a way
that bi  b i+1.
A bidding strategy is a map βi: vi  bi.A nequilibrium is a proﬁle of
strategies (β1,...,β n) such that βi is a best reply for i given the strategies
of all other bidders. An equilibrium is symmetric if all bidders use the same
strategy, β1 =···=βn.
We denote the equilibrium strategy of the symmetric equilibrium of the
ﬁrst- and second-price auction with corruption with β1 and β2, respectively.
We call the corresponding auctions in which corruption is not part of the
game the standard ﬁrst- and second-price auctions, respectively, and denote
5the respective symmetric equilibrium bid functions with B1 and B2.4
3. sealed-bid ﬁrst-price auctions
The surplus from corruption that the auctioneer and the winning bidder can
share is the diﬀerence of the winning and the highest losing bid times the
probability of not being detected, minus the expected penalty imposed on
the winning bidder and on the auctioneer if corruption is detected,
S(b1,b 2) := (1 − δ)(b1 − b2) − δ(p0 + p1). (1)
We assume proportional sharing of this surplus and denote the share re-
ceived by the auctioneer with αS(b1,b 2).
The winning bidder’s payoﬀ if he does not engage in corruption is
un(v1,b 1) := v1 − b1,
and if he does engage in corruption his expected payoﬀ is
uc(v1,b 1,b 2) := un(v1,b 1) + (1 − α)S(b1,b 2).
Corruption pays if the surplus is positive, i.e. if the following bribe condition
is satisﬁed,





bid by γ or more.
4For a survey of the results of the standard ﬁrst- and second-price auctions without
corruption see McAfee and McMillan (1987) and Wolfstetter (1999, Chapter 8).
6A bidder’s expected payoﬀ, given that all rival bidders play the strategy
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Proposition 1 (who wins and who loses) Considerasymmetricequilibrium.
The possibility of corruption does not aﬀect bidders’ expected payoﬀs, it makes
the auctioneer better oﬀ, and the seller worse oﬀ. Corruption also causes a
social deadweight loss if the penalty for corruption is a jail sentence; this dead-
weight loss equals the expected disutility of penalties.
Proof: Bidders’ equilibrium payoﬀs are u∗(v) := u(v,β1(v)). By the En-










G1 is the probability of winning the auction. Evidently, u∗(0) = 0, because
by bidding some b>0, the zero-valuation bidder might win the auction and
get something which is worthless to him; if he loses the auction, he never
receives a bribe because corruption involves only the winning bidder and the
auctioneer. Therefore, bidders’ equilibrium payoﬀs are determined by the
allocation rule G1 only, as in the standard auction.
7The auctioneer must be weakly better oﬀ by the possibility of corrup-
tion, because otherwise he would not participate. Therefore, the seller must
be worse oﬀ. Since the allocation rule is unchanged, the expected gain from
trade is unchanged as well. Thus, every expected gain of the auctioneer must
be matched by a corresponding loss of the seller.
There is, however, another source of losses. If corruption occurs there
is a positive probability that someone will be punished. If the penalty takes
the form of “burning utility” (for instance by sending the winner and the
auctioneer to jail), corruption entails a deadweight loss equal to the expected
disutility of the penalty. This loss is borne by the seller alone, in addition to
the transfer from the seller to the auctioneer. 
Altogether, corruption induces bidders to compete for the gain from
corruption by bidding more aggressively to such an extent that they do not
beneﬁt from it. The auctioneer is the only one gaining in expectations, and
his gain is paid for by the seller. The seller, however, pays more than what the
auctioneer receives (in expectations), because he also loses the expected value
of the penalties δ(p0 + p1) if the penalties take the form of a jail sentences
(as opposed to payments to the seller). Thus, depending on the from of the
penalties, corruption may reduce social welfare.
Proposition 2 (corruption makes bidders aggressive) Bidders with suf-
ﬁciently low valuations bid the same as in the standard ﬁrst-price auction,
whereas bidders with higher valuations bid more aggressively, but still below
their true valuation. Formally, let v∗ := B
−1
1 (γ), then ∀v v ∗ β1(v) = B1(v),
8and ∀v>v ∗ B1( v)<β 1( v)<B 2(v).
Proof: (i)“ β1(v) = B1(v) for v v ∗.” If b γ , bidders’ payoﬀ func-
tion (3) reduces to
u(v,b) = (v − b)G1(β
−1
1 (b)).
This is simply the payoﬀ function of the standard ﬁrst-price auction. Hence,
for suﬃciently small valuations, the equilibrium bid function equals B1. This
is true if B1( v) γ , or equivalently if v B
−1
1 (γ) =: v∗.
(ii)“ β1( v )>B 1(v) for v v ∗.” Suppose v>v ∗, then we know that
corruption occurs with positive probability. Hence, if bidders would bid as
in the standard ﬁrst-price auction, β1(v) = B1(v), their expected payment
in the game with corruption would be less than their expected payment in
the standard ﬁrst-price auction, for otherwise corruption would not pay and
would therefore never occur. But this contradicts revenue equivalence. Thus,
β1( v)>B 1(v) for all v>v ∗.
(iii)“ β1( v )<B 2(v).” Assume v>v ∗, δ(p0 + p1) = 0 (hence γ = 0),
and α = 0. Then corruption takes place for sure. Moreover, corruption is
free to the winning bidder because he will not be punished, δp1 = 0, and the
auctioneer participates for free, α = 0. In this case, the game is a standard
second-price auction and therefore bidding must be the same, β1(v) = B2(v).
Nowconsideranincreaseinthecostofcorruption, i.e.δ(p0+p1)>0orα>0.
Since v>v ∗ corruption occurs with positive probability, but corruption
is costly. This is consistent with revenue equivalence only if bids are less
aggressive than in the second-price auction, thus β1( v)<B 2(v). 
9Clearly if corruption is detected with certainty, δ = 1, corruption never
pays and the game collapses to the ordinary ﬁrst-price auction. In this case
γ =∞ , or equivalently v∗ =∞ , hence everyone has a valuation smaller
than v∗ and so corruption never occurs in equilibrium. This ﬁnding can be
strengthened.
Corollary3 (corruption-free equilibria) All bidders bid as in the stan-
dard ﬁrst-price auction and corruption does not occur, with certainty, if and
only if δ 
B1(1)
B1(1)+p0+p1 =: δ∗.
Proof: “If.” If δ δ ∗, then γ B 1(1), hence v∗ = B
−1
1 (γ)   1, and v v ∗
for all v.
“Only if.” If δ<δ ∗, then γ<B 1(1), hence v∗ = B
−1
1 (γ) < 1, and, with
positive probability, some bidder has a valuation that exceeds v∗. These
bidders will bid more than in the standard ﬁrst-price auction and engage in
corruption, with positive probability. 
This result says that one only needs suﬃcient monitoring (δ∗  δ 1),
not perfect monitoring (δ = 1), to rule out corruption.
We conclude that the sealed bid ﬁrst-price auction is vulnerable to cor-
ruption, that it hurts only the seller, and may give rise to a deadweight loss.
An immediate resolution of this problem is to run an open auction instead.
However, in many circumstances, this may not be feasible, for instance if the
bids are complicated documents, such as bids for major construction jobs
or Olympic games. A sealed-bid second-price, or Vickrey auction, however,
could help. It is not vulnerable to the kind of corruption we have been study-
10ing because the winning bidder is supposed to pay the second bid anyway.
To make corruption work in the Vickrey auction requires the second bidder
to be involved in the corruption scheme as well. This is the topic of the next
section.
4. sealed-bid second-price auctions
The sealed-bid second-price auction is not vulnerable to a corruption scheme
that involves only the auctioneer and the winning bidder because they alone
cannot change the price. They need the collaboration of the second bidder.
Instead of allowing the winning bidder to lower his bid, bidder 2 is
bribed to withdraw or lower his bid. If this scheme succeeds the winning
bidder pays only the third bid. Altogether, this requires the collaboration
of three parties who must share the gain from corruption: the auctioneer,
bidder 1, and bidder 2.
Assume n 3. The surplus to be shared by the auctioneer and bidders
1 and 2 is equal to
S(b2,b 3) := (1 − δ)(b2 − b3) − δ¯ p, (4)
where ¯ p := p0 + p1 + p2 and p0, p1, p2 are the penalties imposed upon the
auctioneer and bidders 1 and 2, respectively. Again, we assume proportional
sharing of the surplus and denote the respective shares with α0, α1, α2, with
α0 + α1 + α2 = 1.
Now consider a bidder with valuation v who makes the bid b.I f h e
happens to win the auction, his payoﬀ is equal to u1n if he does not engage
11in corruption,
u1n(v1,b 2) := v1 − b2,
and equal to u1c if he does engage in corruption
u1c(v1,b 2,b 3) := u1n(v1,b 2) + α1S(b2,b 3).
If he loses the auction he may still gain something. Indeed, in the event that
b is the second highest bid and corruption occurs, his payoﬀ is equal to the
bribe he receives,
u2c(b,b3) := α2S(b,b3).
Corruption pays if the surplus is positive, i.e. if the following bribe con-
dition is satisﬁed,




In words, corruption occurs only if the second bid exceeds the third bid by
γ or more.






























(v − β2(v2))dG1(v2) (6)







(β2(v2) − β2(v3) − γ)f23(v2,v 3)dv3dv2







(b − β2(v3) − γ)f13(v1,v 3)dv3dv1.
Proposition 4 (second-price auction) Suppose n 3. Then Proposition 1
applies also to the second-price auction.
Proof: We only need to show that revenue equivalence applies. Similar to







Therefore, bidders’ equilibrium payoﬀs are as in the standard auctions if and
onlyifu∗(0) = 0. Butthisfollowsimmediatelyfrom(6)becauseβ
−1
2 (β2(0)) =
0, which entails that, for v = 0, (6) is an integral over a null set.
The rest of the proof is analogous to the proof of Proposition 1 and
therefore omitted. 
Interestingly the above result does not apply if there are only two bid-
ders. In this case revenue equivalence is destroyed, and it may happen that a
bidder who stands no chance of winning the auction bids quite aggressively,
because he speculates on earning a bribe for withdrawing his bid, which low-
ers the price paid all the way down to zero.
The surplus from corruption simpliﬁes in this case to
S(b2) := (1 − δ)b2 − δ¯ p.


















(β2(v2) − γ)dG1(v2) (7)
+ α2(1 − δ)(1 − F1(β
−1
2 (b)))(b − γ).
This last term is the expected value of the share of the surplus from corrup-
tion that the losing bidder receives. We will show that, depending upon the
parameters of the game, this last term can upset revenue equivalence.
Proposition 5 (failure of revenue equivalence) Revenueequivalencedoes
not generally hold if n = 2.







We now show that in a symmetric equilibrium one may have u∗(0)>0,
which together with (8) destroys revenue equivalence. Consider the following






β2(v2)dG1(v2) + (1 − F1(β
−1
2 (b)))b.
5If n = 2, then G1 = F, but for clarity we stick to the more general notation.
14For b<β
−1
2 (1) we have
















It follows immediately that u(0,b)>0 for a suﬃciently small but strictly pos-
itive bid b. Therefore, in a symmetric equilibrium one must have u∗(0)>0.

Remark: There is an interesting analogy between the present failure of rev-
enue equivalence and the auctions with price-proportional beneﬁts to bid-
ders. Examples of such auctions are the Amish auction to settle an indivisi-
ble inheritance among family members (Engelbrecht-Wiggans, 1994) and the
breaking-up of partnerships through auctions (Cramton et al., 1987). In his
analysis Engelbrecht-Wiggans establishes that such auctions “unbalance rev-
enue equivalence.” Just like in the present context, the reason for this result
is that even the player who stands no chance to win the auction collects some
payment. Hence u∗(0)>0, which implies that bidders’ equilibrium payoﬀs
u∗(v) are greater than the level reached in standard auctions.
5. more elaborate auctions and corruption schemes
So far we have restricted the analysis of coalitions in corruption schemes to
the smallest possible size, and we restricted the analysis to the two most
common auction rules. In this section we consider some less common auc-
tions and allow for more elaborate corruption schemes that involve larger
coalitions.
15If coalitions involve more bidders, the beneﬁts from corruption can
be raised by further lowering the equilibrium price, yet this gain has to be
shared among more members. Moreover, with each illegal contact between
two parties there is a risk of detection. Therefore, the larger the coalition,
the more likely corruption is detected.
A general corruption scheme in a more general auction framework is as
follows: Consider a k-price auction, k ∈{ 1,...,n}, which awards the item to
the highest bidder who is asked to pay the k-th highest price. The winning
bidder has the option to oﬀer to bidder i a bribe in exchange for withdrawing
his bid. Let c be the number of bidders participating in the corrupt coalition.
c = 1 means that the corruption scheme involves only the winning bidder
and the auctioneer; c = 5 means that the winner has bribed four other bid-
ders to drop their bids. c = 0 means that the winning bidder does not engage
in corruption. If corruption is not detected, the winning bidder pays bk+c,
otherwise he pays bk and all involved bidders and the auctioneer are penal-
ized. This more complex corruption scheme is clearly also available in the
ﬁrst-price auction: Several loosing bidders can be bribed to drop their bids,
and the winning bidder may lower his bid below the original highest losing
bid.
What do we know about the validity of our results if such involved cor-
ruption schemes are available? Proposition 1 goes through if and only if
revenue equivalence holds in these more complicated games as well. How-
ever, there are more constellations where revenue equivalence fails.
As an instructive digression let us study the reasons for the failure of
16revenue equivalence in Proposition 5 more closely. Considering a second-
price auction, and assuming that the corruption scheme involves at most
three players (the highest and the second-highest bidder and the auctioneer),
we found that revenue equivalence holds if n 3 (Proposition 4). The reason
why this works is that in a symmetric equilibrium the bidder with a valuation
equal to zero will never receive a bribe because the third bid exceeds his own
with certainty; hence u∗(0) = 0. This is not true if n = 2. After all, with two
bidders there is no third bid, so the bribe condition requires only that the
losing bid be high enough. Under some parameter constellations, aggressive
bidding by the zero value bidder is indeed part of a symmetric equilibrium.
His probability of winning the auction is still zero, but he does always receive
a bribe in equilibrium, thus u∗(0)>0, destroying revenue equivalence.
If more involved corruption schemes with arbitrarily large coalitions are
feasible, revenue equivalence can fail even if n 3. In a k-price auction with
k>1, every coalition that includes n−k+2 bidders drives the price down to
zero, and therefore a bidder with valuation equal to zero can force a positive
expected payoﬀ by bidding aggressively enough, as demonstrated before for
n = 2, k = 2. If corruption succeeds to lower the price all the way down to
zero, the seller loses an extra chunk of revenue equal to nu∗(0). Therefore,
we conclude that the second-price auction is superior to third- and higher-
price auctions on the ground that smaller coalitions suﬃce to bring the price
down to zero in the higher-price auctions.
The argument does, however, not apply to the comparison of the ﬁrst-
and second-price auction. Both auction forms require all n bidders to par-
17ticipate in the corrupt coalition for revenue equivalence to fail. The second-
price auction, however, has an advantage over the ﬁrst-price auction because
it rules out corrupt coalitions with only two members (the winner and the
auctioneer), to which the ﬁrst-price auction is susceptible. We conclude that,
if corruption is an issue and an open-bid auction is not feasible, the seller
should choose a second-price sealed-bid auction.
6. corruption-proof contracts
Corruption necessarily involves the auctioneer who acts as an agent on be-
half of the seller. In principle, the seller could avoid corruption by running
the auction himself or by setting up appropriate monitors. However, this
solution is often not feasible because the seller is not qualiﬁed for the task,
because ownership is diversiﬁed, or because the seller himself is an agent
for some other party, as in the case of the public sector. Yet, even in these
cases the seller can ﬁght corruption by awarding the auctioneer an appro-
priate incentive contract. We now explain some properties of such incentive
schemes, using the example of a sealed-bid ﬁrst-price auction.
Proposition 6 (corruption-proof incentive contract) Considerasealed-
bid ﬁrst-price auction. The seller can rule out corruption with a costless incen-
tive contract (s,s0) that oﬀers the auctioneer a share s 1 −
δ
δ∗ of the proﬁt
in exchange for a ﬂat fee s0.
Proof: The auctioneer’s compensation equals sb1 − s0. Set s0 := s
 1
0 B1(x)
dF1(x), so that the contract is costless if β1 = B1.
18The total surplus of the corrupt coalition equals the expected reduc-
tion of the price paid to the seller, minus the expected penalty, minus the
reduction of the auctioneer’s compensation received from the seller,
S(b1,b 2) := (1 − δ)(b1 − b2) − δ(p0 + p1) − s(b1 − b2)
= (1 − δ − s)(b1 − b2) − δ(p0 + p1).
We want to ﬁnd conditions that guarantee that this surplus is not positive.
S reaches a maximum at b1 = β1(1) and b2 = β1(0). Therefore, S(β(v1),
β(v2))   0 for all v1, v2 if and only if
s s
∗ := 1 −
δ(β1(1) − β1(0) + p0 + p1)
β1(1) − β1(0)
.
If s s ∗ the game collapses to the standard ﬁrst-price auction without cor-
ruption. Thus, β1 = B1, and s∗ simpliﬁes to
s
∗ = 1 −






If δ<δ ∗ then, by Corollary 3, there is a positive probability that corrup-
tion will occur in equilibrium. But the seller may only have limited inﬂuence
on the detection probability and penalties because they are controlled by the
legal system. However, the seller can compensate the deﬁciency of the le-
gal system by oﬀering the auctioneer an incentive compatible compensation
scheme. For instance, if the detection probability falls twenty percent short
of the smallest level that rules out corruption, i.e. δ = 0.8δ∗, it suﬃces to of-
fer the auctioneer a twenty percent proﬁt share, s∗ = 0.2. With this contract,
19S is non-positive and corruption is prevented at zero cost, and the expected
revenues are the same as in the standard ﬁrst-price auction. We mention
that a similar condition for a corruption-proof compensation scheme can be
developed for second- and higher-price auctions.
Incidentally, linear sharing rules are commonly applied by major auc-
tion houses. For example, Sotheby’s takes a proﬁt share of 12% to 37%.6
Whether this is meant to be a simple markup or an anti-corruption measure
is open to debate. In any case, such contracts reduce or even eliminate the
incentives to engage in the kind of corruption that we analyze in the present
paper.
7. corruption vs. collusion
While the more involved corruption schemes involve some degree of bidder
collusion, there are several notable diﬀerences between corruption and collu-
sion. These diﬀerences indicate that the lessons of the analysis of collusion
do not extend, not even in broad strokes, to the analysis of corruption.
There is a small literature on auction rings which assumes that bidders
6For live auctions at Sotheby’s salesrooms the buyer pays a commission of 10% to 20%
of the hammer price. For internet-auctions at sothebys.com the fee is 10% (called “buyer’s
premium”). In addition, buyers and sellers pay a commission between 2% and 20% of the
hammer prices of all purchases and sales within a calendar year (except sales by Sotheby’s
associates done over the internet). The seller also pays all agreed upon expenses (ship-
ping, insurance, taxes). The total fees (for non-associates), net of expenses, are therefore
10% to 20% buyer’s commission or premium, plus two times an amount between 2% and
20% of the hammer price. Thus, the fees collected by the auctioneer are between 14%
and 60% of the hammer price, or between 12.3% and 37.5% of the totally paid price (ham-
mer plus fees, net of expenses); see http://auction.sothebys.com/conditions.html,
section “Certain Conditions Relating to Buyers,” item 2 “Buyer’s Premium and Pay-
ment,” and http://auction.sothebys.com/auctionslive/sell.html, section “Stan-
dard Commission,” and personal communication with Sotheby’s customer assistance.
20write a self-enforcing collusive agreement prior to the auction with the intent
to suppress competition (see, for example, Robinson (1985) and Graham and
Marshall (1987)).7 One of the main result of that literature is that collusive
agreements are indeed self-enforcing in English and second-price auctions,
provided the auction ring succeeds to select the ring member with the high-
est valuation as designated winner, and side-payments are either absent or
already sunk when the auction takes place.
This literature concludes that English and second-price auctions are
highly susceptible to collusion; therefore, if collusion is an issue, one should
stay away from second-price and English auctions, and use sealed-bid auc-
tions instead. Evidently, this is just the opposite of what should be done to
deter corruption.
However, this literature does not oﬀer a convincing explanation why
collusion occurs in the ﬁrst place, even if the auction is an English or a second-
price auction. The reasoning is as follows: In order to select the ring member
with the highest valuation as designated winner, the auction ring has to run a
preauction and commit the designated winner to make some side-payments
to other ring members in the event when he actually wins the ﬁnal auction.8
An appropriate format would be a second-price preauction or some variation
of it. However, whichever preauction format is employed, Myerson’s (1981)
revenue equivalence theorem implies that bidders adjust their bidding in the
pre-auction in such a way that their overall equilibrium payoﬀs are the same
7Another branch of the literature analyzes enforceable collusive agreements; the main
contribution is McAfee and McMillan (1992).
8Note, side-payments do not require enforceability; indeed, one can always use the old
trick of “tearing-up banknotes.”
21as without collusion, unless the preauction mechanism involves payments
even to bidders with the lowest valuation.9
Obviously, payments to bidders with zero valuation are not meaningful,
because this attracts many undesirable bidders to join the auction ring, as
was already noticed by McAfee and McMillan (1992) in their analysis of weak
cartels. Therefore, this literature does not oﬀer a convincing explanation why
bidders form an auction ring to begin with.
This problem does not plague our analysis of corruption. Anticipating
corruption makes bidders exaggerate their bids because winning the auc-
tion entails the chance of actually paying less due to a successful corruption
scheme. Whenthecorruptagent-auctioneercomesintoplay, bidderscanonly
beneﬁt from corruption, even though beforehand they adjust their bidding
in such a way that these gains are washed out. This is a direct consequence
of the revenue equivalence theorem. Of course, anticipating corruption and
then declining the oﬀer by the corrupt agent-auctioneer would make bidders
worse-oﬀ. Therefore, unlike collusion, corruption occurs and works, even
though bidders do not gain from it.
8. conclusions
Our model establishes corruption as an equilibrium phenomenon of sealed-
bid auctions, if the seller delegates the actual conduct of the auction to an
9Graham and Marshall (1987) design a mechanism that beneﬁts all bidders. In this
mechanism, the ring pays out a ﬁxed sum to each ring member, and collects the second
highest bid from the winning member. The payments to ring members are equal to the
expected value of the second highest valuation. But this mechanism is hardly convincing
because it assumes that the auction ring serves as a budget breaker.
22auctioneer-agent. The model therefore explains the empirical fact that cor-
ruption does happen in public submissions and the like.
The model also shows that bidders do not beneﬁt from corruption in
terms of equilibrium expected payoﬀs. The prospect of participating in a
proﬁtable corruption scheme induces them to raise their bids to such an
extent that bidders’ entire surplus is competed away. Only the auctioneer-
agent beneﬁts from it. This is a consequence of the revenue equivalence
principle. Theentirecostofcorruption, i.e. theexcessproﬁtoftheauctioneer
as well as the expected value of punishment, is borne by the seller. Thus, the
seller has a strong interest to design and apply anti-corruption measures.
Such measures are available. All that is required is an appropriate in-
centive contract between the seller and the auctioneer. We show that such
an incentive contract takes a simple form. It is just an ordinary linear proﬁt
sharing contract, which, incidentally, is the standard form of contract used
by major auction houses, such as Sotheby’s. For this reason we conclude that
similar agreements should be used by government agencies for their public
submissions.
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